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STORIES THAT SWIM UPSTREAM: UNCOVERING 
THE INFLUENCE OF STEREOTYPES AND 
STOCK STORIES IN FOURTH AMENDMENT 
REASONABLE SUSPICION ANALYSIS 
SHERRI LEE KEENE 
We must not pretend that the countless people who are routinely 
targeted by police are “isolated.”  They are the canaries in the 
coal mine whose deaths, civil and literal, warn us that no one can 
breathe in this atmosphere. . . . Until their voices matter too, our 
justice system will continue to be anything but.1 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, there has been much discussion in the media about ag-
gressive policing of African Americans and resulting harms.2  Increased news 
reporting about police shootings of unarmed African-American males has 
sparked broader conversations about targeted policing.3  Government reports 
have followed, confirming that African Americans in many communities are 
disproportionately stopped by police and subject to disparate treatment.4 
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 1.  Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2071 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 2.  See Kenneth Lawson, Police Shootings of Black Men and Implicit Racial Bias: Can’t We 
All Just Get Along, 37 U. HAW. L. REV. 339, 339–40 (2015) (describing extensive news coverage 
of police officer killings of African-American men and boys). 
 3.  See, e.g., Jonathan Capehart, From Trayvon Martin to ‘Black Lives Matter’, WASH. POST 
(Feb. 27, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2015/02/27/from-
trayvon-martin-to-black-lives-matter/; Sharon LaFraniere & Mitch Smith, Philando Castile Was 
Pulled Over 49 Times in 13 Years, Often for Minor Infractions, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/17/us/before-philando-castiles-fatal-encounter-a-costly-trail-of-
minor-traffic-stops.html. 
 4.  See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, INVESTIGATION OF THE 
FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-re-
leases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT (2016), 
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Yet, in the midst of intense public discussion and debate, the Supreme 
Court recently declined to suppress evidence seized following an unlawful 
stop, thus further expanding the tools available to law enforcement.  In Utah 
v. Strieff,5 the Court considered whether evidence discovered during a police 
officer’s unlawful stop of a private citizen must be suppressed and excluded 
from trial when the officer learned during the stop that the citizen was subject 
to a valid warrant for a traffic violation.6  In allowing the seized evidence to 
be used at trial, the Supreme Court seemed to turn a deaf ear to expressed 
concerns about broad police discretion.7 
While the majority’s decision in Strieff was remarkable for its incongru-
ence with conversations outside the courtroom, it was Justice Sotomayor’s 
dissent that attracted attention.8  Justice Sotomayor challenged many of the 
assumptions underlying the majority’s decision, including the majority’s 
finding that the police officer’s conduct in that case was “isolated” and not 
“part of any systemic or recurrent police misconduct.”9  Justice Sotomayor 
also spoke bluntly about what the Court’s decision meant for private citi-
zens.10  But what was most notable about Justice Sotomayor’s dissent was 
the part that she wrote “only for [her]self”11 about the severe consequences 
of unlawful stops and their disproportionate impact on people of color.12  Cit-
                                                 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/883366/download; see also Wesley Lowery, Study Finds Police 
Shoot Unarmed Black Men at Disproportionate Rates, WASH. POST (Apr. 7, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/amphtml/national/study-finds-police-fatally-shoot-unarmed-
black-men-at-disproportionate-rates/2016/04/06/e494563e-fa74-11e5-80e4-
c381214de1a3_story.html.   
 5.  136 S. Ct. 2056, 2064 (2016). 
 6.  Id. at 2060.  
 7.  See id. at 2064–71 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 8.  Id.; see Robert Barnes, Sotomayor’s Fierce Dissent Slams High Court’s Ruling on Evi-
dence from Illegal Stops, WASH. POST (June 20, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/poli-
tics/courts_law/supreme-court-rules-5-3-that-mistakes-by-officer-dont-undermine-convic-
tion/2016/06/20/f1f7d0d2-36f9-11e6-8f7c-d4c723a2becb_story.html; Matt Ford, Justice 
Sotomayor’s Ringing Dissent, ATLANTIC (June 20, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/ar-
chive/2016/06/utah-streiff-sotomayor/487922/. 
 9.  Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2068–69 (challenging the majority’s conclusion, Justice Sotomayor 
pointed to studies and statistics about the prevalence with which warrants are issued and how war-
rants have been used by police across the country to stop private citizens without cause). 
 10.  Id. at 2064 (“This case allows the police to stop you on the street, demand your identifica-
tion, and check it for outstanding traffic warrants—even if you are doing nothing wrong.”).   
 11.  Id. at 2069 (“Writing only for myself, and drawing on my professional experiences, I would 
add that unlawful ‘stops’ have severe consequences much greater than the inconvenience suggested 
by the name.”). 
 12.  Id. at 2070 (stating that “it is no secret that people of color are disproportionate victims of 
this type of scrutiny”).  
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ing to books by renowned African-American authors, Justice Sotomayor ad-
dressed the issue of race in police stops from a space beyond the law—one 
not carved out by Fourth Amendment legal standards.13 
In contrast to the majority, Justice Sotomayor’s dissent addressed con-
cerns about policing practices that have dominated national news in recent 
years, but have appeared to have little impact in individual cases and have 
effected no meaningful changes in the law.14  Indeed, while protests follow-
ing police killings of African Americans continue to erupt like wild fire in 
communities across the country, explicit discussions about the relationship 
between a citizen’s race and the police officer’s decision to conduct a stop 
continue to seem out of place in many criminal courtrooms.15  In many juris-
dictions, the overrepresentation of African Americans as criminal defendants 
alone seems a good conversation starter.  Nevertheless, despite the fact that 
criminal courtrooms continue to be filled with disproportionately high num-
bers of black and brown defendants,16 concerns about the role of race in po-
lice stops continue largely to go unspoken and unaddressed.17 
While many legal outsiders may wonder how increasing public outcries 
of racial inequality seem to have so little impact in the criminal justice sys-
tem, those familiar with the law should have a fairly good idea.  For many 
                                                 
 13.  Id. (citing W.E.B. DUBOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK (1903); JAMES BALDWIN, THE 
FIRE NEXT TIME (1963); TA-NEHISI COATES, BETWEEN THE WORLD AND ME (2015)). 
 14.  Id. at 2068–69. 
 15.  See Robin Walker Sterling, Defense Attorney Resistance, 99 IOWA L. REV. 2245, 2265 
(2014) (discussing ways for defense counsel to “inject issues concerning race discrimination” into 
courtroom conversation “which, for too many reasons to recount . . . manages to bypass race bias 
while being steeped in it”). 
 16.  Trends in U.S. Corrections, SENTENCING PROJECT 1, 5, http://www.sentencingpro-
ject.org/publications/trends-in-u-s-corrections/ (last updated March 2017) (stating that more than 
60% of those incarcerated are persons of color); see also Jamal Hagler, 8 Facts You Should Know 
About the Criminal Justice System and People of Color, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (May 28, 2015, 
12:01 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/criminal-justice/news/2015/05/28/113436/8-
facts-you-should-know-about-the-criminal-justice-system-and-people-of-color/ (stating that “40 
percent of those who are incarcerated are black” despite “being only 13 percent of the overall U.S. 
population”). 
 17.  LYNN LANGTON & MATTHEW DUROSE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, POLICE BEHAVIOR DURING TRAFFIC AND STREET STOPS, 2011, at 1, 9 (2013), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pbtss11.pdf (citing statistics showing that people of color were 
nearly three times more likely to be searched during a stop than whites); see also Racial Disparities 
in Sentencing: Hearing on Reports of Racism in the Justice System of the United States Before the 
Inter-Am. Comm’n on H.R., 153rd Session, at 8 (Oct. 27, 2014) (written testimony by Am. Civil 
Liberties Union) (providing that “of the 4.4 million pedestrian stops made by the New York City 
Police Department from January 2004 through June 2012, 83 percent of the people stopped were 
African-American or Latino and only 10 percent were white”); Sharad Goel et al., Precinct or Prej-
udice? Understanding Racial Disparities in New York City’s Stop-and-Frisk Policy, 10 ANN. 
APPLIED STAT. 365, 380 (2016) (discussing research showing that while controlling for a number 
of variables, relative to similarly situated whites, blacks stopped for possible weapon possession are 
less likely to actually possess a weapon: 2.5% of blacks compared to 3.8% of whites). 
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years, courts have addressed police stops and searches while ignoring matters 
of race, often making a seemingly conscious choice not even to mention the 
defendant’s race in their opinions despite police officer testimony that refer-
ences the defendant’s racial identity.18  Indeed, in 1996, the Supreme Court, 
in Whren v. United States,19 moved courts beyond what was then merely a 
practice of discussing police stops in race-neutral terms; there, the Court held 
that discussions of racial motivation were not relevant to Fourth Amendment 
analysis.20  In Whren, the Court made clear that the focus of courts’ Fourth 
Amendment analysis is whether a stop can be justified on objective grounds, 
not a police officer’s actual motivations.21 
In the twenty years since Whren was decided, however, it has become 
increasingly clear that simply ignoring the role of race in police stops does 
not diminish its impact.  Of course, the Court’s focus on the validity of indi-
vidual stops has done little to address the concern that racial minorities as a 
group are targeted more often for police stops.  Indeed, the legal standard 
asserted in Whren allows courts to validate police stops even where the fac-
tual basis put forth by a police officer is merely a pretext for racial profiling.22   
But, the Court’s decision also fails to account for the hidden effects of racial 
bias in police officer decisionmaking.  In Whren, the Court’s reasoning rests 
on a faulty assumption that police officers’ perceptions and judgments about 
a citizen’s behavior, are not vulnerable themselves to the influence of race.23 
                                                 
 18.  Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 962–71 (1999) (discussing the Supreme Court’s seemingly “conscious choice” 
to strip away the racial dimensions of Terry v. Ohio by removing all references to the race of the 
individuals involved). 
 19. 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
 20.  Id. at 813 (holding that “[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause 
Fourth Amendment analysis” and reasoning that prior cases “foreclose any argument that the con-
stitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual offic-
ers involved”). 
 21.  Id. (“[T]he fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by 
the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action 
taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.” (quoting Scott v. United 
States, 436 U.S. 128, 136, 138 (1978))). 
 22.  Id.  
 23.  See Gabriel J. Chin & Charles J. Vernon, Reasonable but Unconstitutional: Racial Profil-
ing and the Radical Objectivity of Whren v. United States, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 882, 886 (2015) 
(first citing Thompson, supra note 18, at 987–91; and then citing Andrew D. Leipold, Objective 
Tests and Subjective Bias: Some Problems of Discriminatory Intent in the Criminal Law, 73 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 559, 566–68 (1998)) (describing scholarship criticizing the Whren decision on vari-
ous grounds including that the decision overlooks the problem of police perjury and ignores the 
psychological realities of police behavior). 
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Since the time that Whren was decided, implicit bias has become the 
subject of increasing study.24  A mounting body of research by social scien-
tists now shows that racial bias can be unconscious and impact an individ-
ual’s thinking at a fundamental level.25  Negative racial stereotypes associat-
ing African-American men with crime have resulted in deeply engrained and 
widespread bias against members of this group.26  Even individuals who ac-
tively reject negative racial stereotypes can nonetheless be influenced by bi-
ases of which they are not even aware.27  Thus, implicit racial bias can influ-
ence decisionmaking, even where decisionmakers think they are being fair 
and unbiased.28  Unsurprisingly, police officers are not immune, and perhaps, 
given the nature of their work, are even more prone to be influenced.29 
Though implicit bias is now better understood, courts have not yet 
adapted to address the many concerns that recent studies have raised.30  Some 
organizations have made efforts to learn from available research and to strate-
                                                 
 24.  See Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1128–32 
(2012) (describing the Implicit Association Test (IAT) and social scientists’ studies of implicit bias).  
 25.  See Kang et al., supra note 24, at 1132 (describing implicit biases as “attitudes and stereo-
types that are not consciously accessible through introspection.”); L. Song Richardson, Cognitive 
Bias, Police Character, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 267, 271 (2012) (describing 
implicit bias as “a psychological process in which a person’s non-conscious racial beliefs (stereo-
types) and attitudes (prejudices) affect her or his behaviors, perceptions and judgments in ways that 
she or he are largely unaware of and typically, unable to control”); see also CHERYL STAATS ET AL., 
KIRWAN INST., STATE OF THE SCIENCE: IMPLICIT BIAS REVIEW (2016), http://kirwaninsti-
tute.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/implicit-bias-2016.pdf (annual compilation of research 
on implicit bias in various subject areas). 
 26.  Richardson, supra note 25, at 281 (discussing psychological studies by Jennifer Eberhardt 
demonstrating that “when thinking about crime, civilians and officers alike non-consciously think 
about blacks”); see also Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Pro-
cessing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 883 (2004) (“Not only are Blacks thought of as 
criminal, but also crime is thought of as Black.”); Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: 
A Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative Action”, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063, 1072 (2006) (finding 
that by “conservative estimate,” seventy-five percent of whites and fifty percent of blacks show 
anti-Black bias). 
 27.  Kang et al., supra note 24, at 1128–29 (“[A] positive attitude does not foreclose negative 
stereotypes and vice versa.”); Richardson, supra note 25, at 271–72 (“[I]mplicit biases can have 
behavioral effects even when they conflict with an individual’s consciously and genuinely held 
thoughts and feelings.”). 
 28.  Kang et al., supra note 24, at 1129 (stating that the impact of implicit attitudes and stereo-
types on an individual’s decisionmaking and behaviors is not dependent on that individual’s aware-
ness that he or she possesses such biases).   
 29.  Richardson, supra note 25, at 277, 278–79 (discussing how implicit bias can impact the 
judgments of police officers who engage in “proactive policing”).  
 30.  See Kang et al., supra at note 24 (discussing growing scientific literature on implicit bias 
and addressing the fundamental question of what should be done about implicit bias in the court-
room).  
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gize how best to address widespread unconscious racial bias in the court-
room.31  While there has been significant focus on how courts can reduce bias 
in areas such as juror decisionmaking, however, less has been said about how 
courts might address implicit biases that are more firmly rooted in laws and 
procedures.32  For example, while much more is known about implicit bias 
since the Supreme Court made its decision in Whren, courts are still bound 
to follow the legal standard set forth in that case—a legal standard that as-
sumes that police officers’ perceptions and judgments about what they ob-
serve are not tainted by racial bias. 
This Essay challenges courts to acknowledge and address racial bias in 
the courtroom at a more fundamental level.  It discusses the limitations of 
judicial review, which fails to appreciate the potential impact of implicit ra-
cial bias on a police officer’s assessment of a citizen’s behavior.  Specifically, 
it focuses on the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion 
analysis and explains how the potential for biased decisionmaking is wors-
ened in a legal system where race is deemed legally irrelevant, and as a result 
not meaningfully considered.   Moreover, this Essay discusses the specific 
challenge of cognitive shortcuts that can mask implicit racial bias, limiting a 
court’s ability to recognize its potential influence and thus engage in a robust 
review of police officers’ actions. 
Part I discusses how implicit bias can impact an individual’s judgment 
and subsequent decisionmaking.  This Part will focus on implicit racial bias, 
and address the impact that embedded knowledge structures can have on how 
individuals process information.  Part II discusses Fourth Amendment stand-
ards for assessing the lawfulness of police stops and how these standards fail 
to acknowledge the influence of implicit racial bias.  The reasonable suspi-
cion test is meant to balance the need for police intrusion against the consti-
tutional infringement caused by the intrusion on private citizens.  This Part 
will illustrate the role that implicit bias can play when courts engage in judi-
cial review of police officers’ decisionmaking in circumstances that can trig-
ger racially biased thinking, but in which the influence of racial bias is ig-
nored.  Ignoring the potential influence of race can skew the conversation in 
the courtroom and lead to an overestimation of the need for police intrusion.  
Specifically, this Part will discuss, first, how the “objective facts” test artic-
ulated in Terry v Ohio33 fails to account for the impact of implicit racial bias 
on police officers’ perceptions of citizens’ ambiguous behaviors.  Second, 
                                                 
 31.  See STAATS ET AL., supra note 25; PAMELA M. CASEY ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE 
CTS., HELPING COURTS ADDRESS IMPLICIT BIAS: RESOURCES FOR EDUCATION (2012), 
http://www.ncsc.org/~/me-
dia/Files/PDF/Topics/Gender%20and%20Racial%20Fairness/IB_report_033012.ashx. 
 32.  See STAATS ET AL., supra note 25, at 19–27. 
 33.  392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
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this Part will discuss why legal standards encouraging courts’ reliance on 
police officers’ experiences relieves courts of the need to demand explana-
tions for police officers’ assumptions that may in fact be the result, not of 
sound reason, but rather of racial bias.  Third, this Part discusses how courts’ 
failure to acknowledge the role that race can play in police officers’ deci-
sionmaking leads to court findings of reasonable suspicion that appear to be 
based less on objective facts and more on racial stereotypes. 
I.  HOW IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS CAN IMPACT PERCEPTION, JUDGMENT, AND 
DECISIONMAKING 
In 2013, the Supreme Court denied the defendant’s petition for writ of 
certiorari in the case of Calhoun v. United States.34  Defendant Calhoun, an 
African-American man, had been convicted in Texas federal court for partic-
ipation in a drug conspiracy.35  The primary issue at trial was whether Cal-
houn knew that the friend and associates he had accompanied on a road trip 
were going to engage in a drug transaction, or whether, as Calhoun argued, 
he was merely present in the car and did not know of the plan to purchase 
drugs.36  Among the evidence put forth to prove Calhoun’s knowledge was 
the testimony of two alleged co-conspirators who pleaded guilty, testimony 
of law enforcement officers who purported that they had discussed drugs with 
Calhoun, and Calhoun’s possession of a gun.37  In his defense, Calhoun ex-
plained that he always carried a concealed weapon and was licensed to do 
so.38  As Justice Sotomayor put it, “[i]t was up to the jurors to decide whom 
they believed.”39 
Justice Sonia Sotomayor drew notice in that case when she wrote a state-
ment regarding a “racially charged remark” made by the prosecutor during 
Calhoun’s trial.40  Specifically, her statement addressed the prosecution’s 
suggestion to jurors that they should fill in evidentiary gaps with assumptions 
based on racial stereotypes.41  During the prosecutor’s cross-examination of 
Calhoun, Calhoun explained that the night before the arrest, “he had detached 
himself from the group when his friend arrived at their hotel room with a bag 
of money.”42  Consistent with his defense, Calhoun testified that he “didn’t 
know” what was happening, and that it “made [him] think . . . [t]hat [he] 
                                                 
 34.  133 S. Ct. 1136, 1136 (2013) (mem.).   
 35.  Id. (Sotomayor, J., joined by Breyer, J., statement respecting denial for writ of certiorari). 
 36.  Id.  
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id.  
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. 
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didn’t want to be there.”43  After Calhoun failed to answer the prosecution’s 
questions about why he did not want to be in the hotel room, the prosecutor 
then asked more pointedly: “You’ve got African-Americans, you’ve got His-
panics, you’ve got a bag full of money.  Does that tell you—a light bulb 
doesn’t go off in your head and say, This is a drug deal?”44  Justice Sotomayor 
described the prosecutor’s question as “pernicious in its attempt to substitute 
racial stereotype for evidence, and racial prejudice for reason.”45 
Justice Sotomayor’s remarks were noted for her strong rejection of the 
prosecutor’s explicit use of racial bias.46  Observers would be remiss, how-
ever, if they were to conclude that the race of the defendant probably would 
not have played a role in the jurors’ assessment of the case absent the prose-
cutor’s comment.  While the prosecutor’s explicit remarks are deeply trou-
bling, the deeper concern of racial bias impacting the factfinders’ deci-
sionmaking was not prompted only by the prosecutor’s statement.  Even if 
the race of the defendant was not explicitly mentioned aloud, it is likely that 
negative stereotypes of black and Latino men as criminals—here, drug deal-
ers—would have unconsciously influenced the jurors’ assessments. 
As indicated above, studies by cognitive psychologists show that nega-
tive racial stereotypes associating African-American men with crime are 
deeply rooted in American society.47  These pervasive stereotypes can lead 
to unconscious associations between black males and criminality, and can 
have a significant impact in the courtroom.  Indeed, one study has shown that 
African Americans are not afforded a true presumption of innocence, as fact-
finders tend to find criminality among African Americans where they would 
not among others.48  Studies have suggested that the mere presence of an 
African-American man can automatically trigger thoughts about stereotypes 
                                                 
 43.  Id. (quoting Trial Transcript at 125–26 (Mar. 8, 2011)). 
 44.  Id. (quoting Trial Transcript at 127 (Mar. 8, 2011)). 
 45.  Id. at 1137.  
 46.  See, e.g., David G. Savage, Justice Sonia Sotomayor Slams Texas Prosecutor for Racial 
Remark, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/feb/25/nation/la-na-court-so-
tomayor-20130226. 
 47.  See supra note 26.  
 48.  Justin D. Levinson et al., Guilty by Implicit Racial Bias: The Guilty/Not Guilty Implicit 
Association Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187, 207 (2010) (discussing results showing “implicit as-
sociations between Black and Guilty,” and that these associations “predicted judgments of the pro-
bative value of evidence”).  
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associated with members of his social group, such as criminality.49  Moreo-
ver, not raising the issue of race where bias is triggered can lead to more 
biased decisionmaking than when race is acknowledged.50 
To be clear, racial bias can lead an individual to interpret the behavior 
of an African-American man differently than they would interpret the same 
behavior of a white man.  In fact, one study showed that racial bias can cause 
individuals to interpret identical behavior differently based solely on the race 
of the individual being observed.51  There, research subjects were asked to 
observe two men engaged in a heated dialogue.  During the exchange, one 
man ultimately shoved the other.  While all observers watched two men en-
gage in this interaction, the researchers manipulated the race of the men being 
shoved and doing the shoving.  The results showed that while most observers 
perceived a shove by an African-American male to be violent or aggressive, 
the identical behavior by a white male was far more often perceived to be 
playful.52 
To understand how race influences an individual’s perceptions, judg-
ments, and decisions, it is important to consider how people cognitively pro-
cess what they hear and observe.  To begin, it is important to know that new 
experiences are understood by being placed into existing cognitive frames 
derived from earlier experiences.53  These embedded knowledge structures 
give meaning to experiences, shaping perceptions and ordering thinking.54  
                                                 
 49.  Eberhardt et al., supra note 26, at 876 (discussing contemporary social psychological re-
search showing that the presence of social groups can activate concepts with which that person’s 
social group has been associated). 
 50.  Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in a Not Yet Post-
Racial Society, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1555, 1555 (2013). 
 51.  Birt L. Duncan, Differential Social Perception and Attribution of Intergroup Violence: 
Testing the Lower Limits of Stereotyping of Blacks, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 590 
(1976); see also Richardson, supra note 25, at 276–77 (discussing the Duncan study).  
 52.  Duncan, supra note 51, at 595.  The study found that when both men were black, sixty-
nine percent thought the shove was violent, compared to thirteen percent when both men were white.  
Id.  When a black individual shoved a white man, seventy-five percent thought the shove was vio-
lent, compared to seventeen percent when the race of the individuals was reversed.  Id.  
 53.  Linda L. Berger, How Embedded Knowledge Structures Affect Judicial Decision Making: 
An Analysis of Metaphor, Narrative, and Imagination in Child Custody Disputes, 18 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 259, 263 (2009); see J. Christopher Rideout, Storytelling, Narrative Rationality, 
and Legal Persuasion, 14 LEGAL WRITING J. 53, 66 (2008) (“What ‘could’ happen is determined, 
not by the decision makers’ undertaking an empirical assessment of actual events, but rather by their 
looking to a store of background knowledge about these kinds of narratives—to a set of stock sto-
ries.” (citing W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTINGING REALITY IN THE 
COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE 50 (1981)). 
 54.  Berger, supra note 53 (“Because of the way the mind works and the culture is constructed, 
metaphor and narrative are essential, and unavoidable, for persuasion and understanding.” (first 
citing ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 217–45 (2000); and then 
citing GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE EMBODIED MIND AND 
ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT 128 (1999)).  
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They allow individuals to plug new events “into slots in an existing frame-
work” and to avoid “having to interpret and construct a diagram of inferences 
and relationships for the first time.”55  As such, these embedded knowledge 
structures provide both shortcuts and stereotypes, turning “new and unfamil-
iar situations into the normal and natural course of events.”56 
While embedded knowledge structures play a central role in cognitive 
processing, their function is not always appreciated by the thinker.  People 
are often unaware of the role that these constructs play in their understanding 
of the world around them.  As Professor Linda Berger has put it, “both infor-
mation and understanding float beneath the surface, neither consciously ac-
quired nor examined.”57  Thus, our conceptual cognitive processes can oper-
ate as a “hidden hand,” shaping “how we conceptualize all aspects of our 
experience.”58 
A number of cognitive frames have been discussed in social psychology 
literature as embedded knowledge structures including categorizations, sche-
mas, and stock stories.59  “Categorization” refers to the use of categories to 
classify elements into groups; this term refers to where individuals place new 
information.60  Categorization can lead to classifications of people based on 
race.61  And, once a person is categorized into a group, other people then 
apply “schema,” or generalized knowledge about the group to “draw infer-
ences and derive predictions.”62  Thus, racial stereotypes are schema as they 
organize “people’s expectations about other people who fall into certain so-
cial categories.”63 
In judging a new event to determine what might have happened, indi-
viduals also look unconsciously to deeply embedded plotlines or dominant 
                                                 
 55.  Id. at 265. 
 56.  Id.  
 57.  Id. at 263 (citing LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 54, at 9–15.) 
 58.  Id. (quoting LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 54, at 128); see Lisa Kern Griffin, Narrative, 
Truth, and Trial, 101 GEO. L.J. 281, 287 (2013) (“Paradigms exercise a ‘grip on the human imagi-
nation’ and therefore guide and influence the reception of evidence as well.  They recur so frequently 
in stories that familiar elements can enact them implicitly.” (footnote omitted) (quoting JEROME 
BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING 43 (1998)). 
 59.  See Ronald Chen & Jon Hansen, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge Struc-
tures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1131–32 (2004) (noting that the dividing 
line between categories, schemas, and similar concepts is somewhat ambiguous in the social psy-
chology literature); see also Berger, supra note 53, at 264–69 (discussing the embedded knowledge 
structures of metaphor and narrative). 
 60.  Chen & Hansen, supra note 59, at 1132. 
 61.  Id. at 1134 (discussing how schema, including “distinctions commonly made according to 
race,” can impact categorization).  
 62.  Id. at 1132 (citing SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELBY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 105 (1991)).   
 63.  Id. at 1137 (describing role schemas that help organize knowledge about “the set of behav-
iors expected of a person in a particular social position” such as those acquired at birth (quoting 
FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 62, at 119). 
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stories, often referred to as stock stories.64  Without their being aware, these 
stock stories can lead people to fill in factual gaps with a store of 
knowledge.65  A stock story “resolves ambiguity and complements ‘given’ 
information with much ‘assumed’ information.”66  Thus, individuals may be 
persuaded to believe a narrative about an ambiguous situation, not because it 
necessarily reflects what happened, but because it corresponds to a familiar 
stock story.67  As stock stories can involve characters who are categorized by 
race and subject to corresponding stereotypes that shape people’s expecta-
tions, it would appear that certain stock stories are also associated with cer-
tain racial groups.68 
If one considers the Calhoun case in this light, it is easy to see how 
implicit racial bias likely played a role in jurors’ assessments of the evidence 
in that case, regardless of whether the defendant’s race was explicitly men-
tioned.  The racial identity of the defendant alone would prompt his catego-
rization and trigger unconscious associations between African-American 
men and criminality.  Beyond this, the story told by the prosecution of an 
African-American man participating in a drug deal might have rung a famil-
iar bell with jurors who had heard this plotline—and others depicting African 
Americans as criminals—many times before.  Put plainly, as jurors heard the 
prosecution’s story in Calhoun, they may have unconsciously referenced a 
familiar stock story, and the image invoked in their mind might have involved 
a similar scene with similar characters. 
                                                 
 64.  See Rideout, supra note 53, at 66 (discussing how in determining what happened in a new 
circumstance, individuals can unconsciously make reference to “a store of background knowledge 
about these kinds of narratives—to a set of stock stories”); Griffin, supra note 58, at 286, 297–98 
(“‘Good lawyers,’ one . . . manual states, tie the circumstances of the case to ‘plotlines already 
deeply embedded in listeners’ minds, to mythic narratives whose familiar moves reveal how the 
world is and how people, faced with fateful choices, act for good or for ill.’” (quoting SAM 
SCHRAGER, THE TRIAL LAWYER’S ART 7 (1999)).  
 65.  Helen A. Anderson, Police Stories, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 19, 24 (2016) (citing Berger, supra 
note 53, at 266) (“Storytelling is said to be central to our ability to make sense out of a series of 
chronological events otherwise lacking in coherence and consistency . . . .”).  
 66.  Anderson, supra note 65, at 24 (quoting Gerald P. López, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. 
REV. 1, 6 (1984)). 
 67.  Rideout, supra note 53, at 66 (“The narrative is plausible, and persuasive, to the extent that 
it bears a structural correspondence to one of these stock scripts or stories, not to the extent that it 
‘really happened.’” (quoting Ty Alper et al., Stories Told and Untold: Lawyering Theory Analysis 
of the First Rodney King Assault Trial, 12 CLIN. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2005)); see also Anderson, supra 
note 65, at 24; Griffin, supra note 58, at 297–98.  
 68.  See Thompson, supra note 18, at 988 (discussing culturally embedded stories about groups 
and stating that one story frequently applied to people of color is that they are prone to engage in 
criminal and violent activity than whites); LEE ANNE BELL, STORYTELLING FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE: 
CONNECTING NARRATIVE AND THE ARTS IN ANTIRACIST TEACHING 29 (2010) (describing stock 
stories as familiar stories that explain racial dynamics in ways that support the status quo).   
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II.  THE POTENTIAL INFLUENCE OF IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS IN POLICE 
OFFICER PERCEPTION, JUDGMENT, AND DECISIONMAKING 
As discussed above, implicit bias is unconscious and pervasive in our 
society.  As such, it can impact individuals at all levels of the criminal justice 
system, including police officers.69  Indeed, the situations that police find 
themselves in are ripe for implicit bias.  For example, where police are ac-
tively seeking individuals who are engaged in criminal activity, this can “ac-
tivate[] negative racial stereotypes that can affect the interpretation of ambig-
uous behaviors.”70  Moreover, police are often called upon to judge 
ambiguous situations under stressful conditions, and make quick decisions 
with limited information.71  In such circumstances, an individual will often 
resort to referencing stereotypes, and implicit bias can play a role.72 
In this Part, the author considers how embedded knowledge structures—
categorization, schema, and stock stories—operate in the background as po-
lice officers evaluate the suspiciousness of citizens’ behavior.  Further, it con-
siders how current legal standards not only ignore, but also mask, the poten-
tial influence of racial bias, thus diminishing the effectiveness of judicial 
review.  To begin, it is important to set the stage by describing the legal stand-
ards that courts apply to police stops.  
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution sets forth the 
right of the people to security “against unreasonable searches and seizures.”73  
The Supreme Court has long recognized the importance of this provision to 
all citizens and the need for restrained law enforcement.74  Through its deci-
sions, the Supreme Court has given meaning to the Fourth Amendment, set-
ting forth the relevant legal standards that govern police encounters with pri-
vate citizens. 
                                                 
 69.  Kang et al., supra note 24, at 1135–52 (discussing some of the crucial points in a criminal 
case from police encounters to sentencing where implicit bias can influence decisionmaking). 
 70.  Richardson, supra note 25, at 281 (citing Eberhardt et al., supra note 26, at 876). 
 71.  Id. at 282 (citing Kurt Hugenberg & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Ambiguity in Social Catego-
rization: The Role of Prejudice and Facial Affect in Race Categorization, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 342, 
342 (2004)). 
 72.  Id.  
 73.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause . . . .”  Id. 
 74.  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1968).  In Terry, the Court declared:  
This inestimable right of personal security belongs as much to the citizen on the streets 
of our cities as to the homeowner closeted in his study to dispose of his secret affairs. . . . 
“No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the 
right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all 
restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.” 
Id. (quoting Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).  
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In 1968, in the landmark case Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held 
that police officers could briefly detain private citizens that they deemed to 
be suspicious on less than probable cause.75  In reaching this conclusion, the 
Court confirmed that the Fourth Amendment would still apply in this context 
and that “the notions which underlie both the warrant procedure and the re-
quirement of probable cause remain fully relevant.”76  In introducing a new 
“reasonable suspicion” standard, the Court stated that the relevant test re-
quired balancing “the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the 
search [or seizure] entails.”77 
In framing the relevant legal standard, the Court decided “first to focus 
upon the governmental interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion 
upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen.”78  To jus-
tify a Terry police stop, it was determined that a police officer must have “a 
reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is involved 
in criminal activity.”79  Indeed, police officers “must be able to point to spe-
cific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from 
those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.”80  The Court has allowed 
“commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.”81  How-
ever, a police officer is required to articulate something more than an “incho-
ate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’”82 
In Terry, the Court also discussed the need for judicial review, empha-
sizing the importance of judges’ “detached, neutral scrutiny” in evaluating 
the reasonableness of specific circumstances.83  For judicial review, the Court 
stated that it was “imperative that the facts be judged against an objective 
standard.”84  The Court framed the relevant legal question as: “[W]ould the 
facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure . . . ‘warrant a man 
of reasonable caution in the belief’ that the action taken was appropriate?”85 
Prior to the Terry decision, concerns were already being raised about 
the impact of police stop and frisk practices on minority communities.86  
                                                 
 75.  Id. at 24. 
 76.  Id. at 20. 
 77.  Id. at 21 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534–35, 536–37 (1967)).   
 78.  Id. at 20–21 (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 534–35, 536–37).  
 79.  Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 
(1979); and then citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882–83 (1975)). 
 80.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.  
 81.  Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000). 
 82.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. 
 83.  Id. at 21. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. at 21–22 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).  
 86.  Renee Hutchins, Stop Terry: Reasonable Suspicion, Race, and a Proposal to Limit Terry 
Stops, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 883, 885 (2013); Thompson, supra note 18, at 957; see 
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These concerns were barely addressed by the Supreme Court in Terry; there, 
the Court dismissed the problem as one consisting of a few rogue police of-
ficers that the exclusionary rule was impotent to change.87  While the Court 
in Terry gave little consideration to the racial dynamics of police stops, this 
concern was later addressed by Justice Thurgood Marshall.  In a 1989 deci-
sion, United States v. Sokolow,88 Justice Marshall remarked on the function 
of the reasonable suspicion standard as a way to guard against stops that are 
prompted on the basis of a defendant’s race: 
By requiring reasonable suspicion as a prerequisite to such sei-
zures, the Fourth Amendment protects innocent persons from be-
ing subjected to “overbearing or harassing” police conduct carried 
out solely on the basis of imprecise stereotypes of what criminals 
look like, or on the basis of irrelevant personal characteristics such 
as race.89 
The Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Whren in 1996, however, 
indicated that Fourth Amendment analysis was to be conducted without con-
siderations of a police officer’s “[s]ubjective intentions.”90  While failing to 
address racial profiling, the Court reiterated in that case that “circumstances, 
viewed objectively,” must justify the police officer’s action.91 
The following discussion considers whether the “objective facts” test 
set forth in Terry adequately protects African-American citizens from police 
stops based on racial bias.  This discussion will consider the role that implicit 
racial bias can play in a police officer’s assessment of a citizen’s behavior, 
and the limitations of judicial review that, following Whren, denies that race 
might even be relevant to such an assessment.  This Part will also consider 
how the relevant legal standards encourage courts to explain evidentiary gaps 
with a generalized ideal of police expertise, rather than consider the possibil-
ity of racial bias.  Lastly, it will consider the consequences of the Court’s 
missed opportunities to address the influence of racial bias on police officers’ 
decisionmaking in police stops. 
                                                 
also Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 363 n.133 (1998) 
(“[The Commission] not[ed] that police departments, reacting to concerns about crime, have begun 
aggressive patrol practices, including stop and frisk tactics, ‘without weighing their tension-creating 
effects [for the Negro community] and the resulting relationship to civil disorder.’” (quoting 
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 159–60 (1968))).   
 87.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 13–14; Thompson, supra note 18, at 972. 
 88.  490 U.S. 1, 11–19 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
 89.  Id. at 12 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 14–15 & n.11).   
 90.  Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). 
 91.  Id. at 813 (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136, 138 (1978)). 
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A.  Stories Are Treated as Objective Fact 
As Part I suggests, meaning is contextual.  As such, one troubling aspect 
of the Court’s Fourth Amendment analysis is that it starts by considering the 
“facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure.”92  Indeed, the 
Court’s confidence in police officers’ statements as a reliable starting point 
for judicial review of police conduct rests on the faulty premise that bias does 
not alter appreciably a police officer’s perception of what he is observing and 
deems to be fact.  To the contrary, “much of our knowledge is tacit and much 
of our thinking is unconscious.”93  Embedded knowledge structures deter-
mine our “experience and expression”; they work without our awareness 
shaping perceptions and reasoning processes.94  Put simply, one must con-
sider whether a citizen’s observed behaviors make a police officer suspicious, 
or whether suspicion colors the meaning that the police officer assigns to 
what he observes.95 
An illustration for this point—that some purported “facts” are subjec-
tive—can be found in Terry itself.  In Terry, the police officer testified that 
he believed that Terry and his companion, both African-American males, 
who he had seen standing and moving about on the street, were “casing a job, 
a stick-up.”96  There, the police officer based his suspicion that the men in-
tended to rob a store on a combination of seemingly innocent behaviors.  As 
the Court observed: “There is nothing unusual in two men standing together 
on a street corner, perhaps waiting for someone.  Nor is there anything sus-
picious about people in such circumstances strolling up and down the street, 
singly or in pairs.  Store windows, moreover, are made to be looked in.”97 
In finding that the police officer was able “to point to specific and artic-
ulable facts” sufficient to justify the police stop, however, the Court did not 
merely rely on a bland recitation of clearly observable facts drawn from the 
police officer’s testimony.98  Rather, the Court repackaged these facts and 
                                                 
 92.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–22. 
 93.  Berger, supra note 53, at 263; see also Griffin, supra note 58, at 287 (describing narrative 
as “preconceptual,” with the power to “influence not just how facts are perceived but what facts 
are”). 
 94.  Berger, supra note 53, at 262–63. 
 95.  United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 13 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that 
“[r]eflexive reliance” on a drug courier profile “runs a far greater risk than does ordinary, case-by-
case police work of subjecting innocent individuals to unwarranted police harassment and deten-
tion”).  In Sokolow, Justice Marshall stated that such a risk was enhanced by the profile’s “chame-
leon-like way of adapting to any particular set of observations.”  Id. (quoting United States v. 
Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413, 1418 (9th Cir. 1987)); Kang et al., supra note 24, at 1137 (discussing 
studies by social scientists finding that police officers may “have an implicit association between 
Blackness and weapons that could affect both their hunches and their visual attention”). 
 96.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 6. 
 97.  Id. at 22–23. 
 98.  Id. at 21–23. 
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organized them into a narrative.  Utilizing this framework, the Court pre-
sented the police officer’s testimony in a manner that supported the police 
officer’s assertion that the behavior of Terry and his companion, though they 
were engaged in no activities that alone appeared to be unlawful, were none-
theless suspicious: 
[T]he story is quite different where, as here, two men hover about 
a street corner for an extended period of time, at the end of which 
it becomes apparent that they are not waiting for anyone or any-
thing; where these men pace alternatively along an identical route, 
pausing to stare in the same store window roughly 24 times; where 
each completion of this route is followed immediately by a confer-
ence between the two men on the corner; where they are joined in 
one of these conferences by a third man who leaves swiftly; and 
where the two men finally follow the third and rejoin him a couple 
of blocks away.99 
Indeed, it is easy to see how a story makes a more compelling case for 
reasonable suspicion than bare facts alone.  However, the Court’s narrative 
also reveals the malleable nature of the police officer’s statements, not to 
mention the persuasive quality of the Court’s story.  Indeed, one might ques-
tion how imperfect facts couched in story, can ever be labeled as “objective 
facts.”100  Stories are certainly told from a perspective, and the author controls 
the meaning.101  In Terry, the Court fashioned the police officer’s testimony 
into a familiar narrative with a clear theme. 
Moreover, the police officer’s statements took on new significance in 
the story as the Court selected words to describe the men’s behavior that car-
ried subtly different meanings and some negative connotations.  In the 
Court’s retelling of the police officer’s story, the men who it first described 
as being engaged in the act of “standing together” were later described as 
“hover[ing],” not to mention that their “strolling” became “pac[ing],” and 
their “look[ing]” became “star[ing].”102  Indeed, in the Terry opinion, while 
the Court articulated the need for judicial review based on “objective facts,” 
                                                 
 99.  Id. at 23. 
 100.  See Anderson, supra note 65, at 31–39 (comparing stories in judicial opinions that focus 
on police officers’ perspectives with those that humanize the private citizen and tell the story from 
the private citizens’ point of view; and noting the different choices made as to “language, point of 
view, detail, and context”).  
 101.  Ruth Anne Robbins, Harry Potter, Ruby Slippers and Merlin: Telling the Client’s Story 
Using the Characters and Paradigm of the Archetypal Hero’s Journey, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 767, 
772 (2006) (“Each character has needs and goals.  The author controls how much the audience 
knows about those needs and goals.”).  
 102.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 6, 22–23.  
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the Justices did not distinguish the clearly observable facts from the meaning 
that the police officer—and later the Court itself—attached to them.103 
B.  Police Officers’ Logical Leaps Are Not Meaningfully Challenged 
While it is troubling that courts may treat stories as “objective facts,” it 
is equally concerning when courts fail to critically consider why police offic-
ers judge defendants’ seemingly innocent conduct to be indicative of criminal 
activity.  The opinion in Terry, for example, provides no evidence that the 
Court ever received a satisfactory answer as to what it was about the partic-
ular men’s actions that led the police officer to judge their behavior as suspi-
cious.  Clearly, the police officer’s assessment was based on his brief, visual 
observation of the men.  While the opinion provides that the police officer 
did not know the men he observed, however, the police officer was “unable 
to say precisely what first drew his eye to them.”104  The officer also claimed 
that when he looked over to them, the two men “didn’t look right” to him.105  
Nonetheless, the Court considered the police officer’s assessments of suspi-
cion to be sufficient given his police experience.106 
In contrast to the Court in Terry, and many cases that have followed, in 
his dissenting opinion in the relatively recent case, United States v. Mason,107 
Judge Roger Gregory of the Fourth Circuit raised concerns about a police 
officer’s inability to explain why he thought a defendant’s seemingly inno-
cent actions were suspicious.108  In Mason, the court considered whether a 
police officer was reasonable in his suspicion that the defendant, an African-
American man, was engaged in drug activity, justifying an extension of a 
traffic stop.109  In that case, the majority acknowledged that “several of the 
facts, when taken alone, were . . . consistent with innocent travel.”110  But, 
similar to Terry, the court found that the facts, when taken as a whole, sup-
ported a finding of suspicion.111 
In his dissent, Judge Gregory questioned both what the majority deemed 
to be the “objective facts” in the case and the story put forth by the major-
ity.112  To start, the dissent and the majority described the police officer’s 
statements as to why Mason was suspicious in very different ways.  Mason 
                                                 
 103.  See id. at 21–22. 
 104.  Id. at 5. 
 105.  Id.; Thompson, supra note 18, at 966.  
 106.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 23. 
 107.  628 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 108.  Id. at 136 (Gregory, J., dissenting).   
 109.  Id. at 128 (majority opinion). 
 110.  Id.  
 111.  Id. at 128–29.  
 112. Id. at 137 (Gregory, J., dissenting).  
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and his companion, both African-American men, were stopped on the inter-
state in Georgia, not too far from Atlanta, in a vehicle that had tinted win-
dows.113  The dissent boiled down the relevant “objective facts” as follows: 
(1) Mason’s one-to-two second delay in pulling over; (2) Mason’s 
looking in the direction of his passenger; (3) the fact that there was 
a strong smell of air freshener in the car; (4) the fact that Mason 
was driving away from Atlanta; (5) the fact that there was only one 
key in the ignition; and (6) the fact that there was no visible lug-
gage in the backseat.114 
While the dissent focused on observable facts, by contrast, the major-
ity’s asserted facts were lengthy and offered in the form of a narrative.115  In 
finding that the police officer had articulated facts supporting reasonable sus-
picion, the majority noted that context matters.116  But, there, the context ap-
pears to have been supplied mostly by the police officer.117  For example, 
with respect to the single key on Mason’s key ring, relying on the police of-
ficer’s testimony, the court presented the following narrative: 
[The officer] observed that there was only a single key on Mason’s 
key ring.  He concluded that this fact, combined with the fact that 
the two men were coming from the direction of Atlanta, a city that, 
according to [the officer], was ranked third in the nation in terms 
of drug distribution, on a known drug route, could indicate that the 
men might have been on a “turnaround” trip as drug couriers.118 
A wide logical gap exists between the fact that Mason had a single key 
in the ignition and the above narrative of drug activity.  However, the major-
ity did not question why the police officer concluded that the single key on 
                                                 
 113.  Id. at 126 (majority opinion). 
 114.  Id. at 137 (Gregory, J., dissenting). 
 115.  Id. at 128–29 (majority opinion); see Anderson, supra note 65, at 36–38 (providing an 
example of a story told in a judicial opinion from the private citizen’s perspective without explana-
tions for the police officer’s actions).  
 116.  Mason, 628 F.3d at 129–30 (“[C]ontext matters: actions that may appear innocuous at a 
certain time or in a certain place may very well serve as a harbinger of criminal activity under 
different circumstances.” (quoting United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 336 (4th Cir. 2008))). 
 117.  Anderson, supra note 65, at 38 (discussing context supplied by police officers that is in-
cluded in judicial opinions, and rarely questioned, including that the area where an incident occurred 
is a “high crime area” or “other general facts about suspected criminals that officers have learned 
through ‘training and experience’”). 
 118.  Mason, 628 F.3d at 129.  The dissent included additional details of the police officer’s 
assumptions based on Mason’s possession of a single key:  
[The police officer] stated that [the single key in the ignition] suggested to him that the 
car was borrowed.  Because it was borrowed, he stated, there was no house key. “And 
the reason there’s no house keys,” he stated, “is because there’s criminal activity being 
pursued and no one wants to be linked to the car or criminal activity.” 
Id. at 137 (Gregory, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).  
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the key ring suggested that its particular possessor was a drug courier, or 
whether something about the two men led the officer to attach such a meaning 
to the key.  Instead, the majority readily adopted the police officer’s narrative 
of the meaning of the single key and other “facts,” while noting that several 
of the “facts” presented by the police officer [alone] “could hardly have dis-
tinguished suspicious activity from innocent travel.”119  In finding reasonable 
suspicion, the majority, without much further discussion, concluded that the 
facts taken together would have given an “experienced officer a reasonable 
suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.”120 
Judge Gregory, however, questioned the police officer’s significant 
leaps in logic, stating that the police officer failed to articulate why any of 
the observable facts “would be associated with criminal activity.”121  Accord-
ing to Judge Gregory, “[the police officer] provided ‘articulable’ facts, yet 
provided no basis for why these factors were ‘suspicious’ individually or in 
the aggregate.”122  Judge Gregory also noted that reasonable suspicion anal-
ysis should not change with the gender, race, or ethnicity of the motorists.123  
To further his point, Judge Gregory provided an alternative narrative that in-
corporated what he had identified as the relevant “objective facts.”  In that 
narrative, the two African-American male motorists were replaced with a 
mother and child: 
While running errands with her child, a mother is pulled over on I-
20, just north of the Savannah River.  It takes her one second to 
pull over to the right-side emergency lane and while doing so, she 
looks to the right, which also happens to be where her child is sit-
ting.  She has cherry-flavored air freshener hanging from her rear-
view mirror.  She has one key in the ignition because her key, like 
many keys on modern vehicles that also electronically lock and un-
lock car doors, is too big to fit on standard-issue key chains.  And 
she has no luggage in the backseat because, like most people trav-
elling to the grocery store, she does not plan to spend the night.124 
Judge Gregory noted that a police officer’s decision to then detain the 
woman and child, in the example, and to investigate them for drug trafficking 
“would be patently unreasonable.”125  The dissent’s hypothetical story sug-
gests what courts often seem to ignore, that so-called “objective facts” are 
not always what leads the police officer to be suspicious, so much as the 
                                                 
 119.  Id. at 129 (majority opinion). 
 120.  Id.  
 121.  Id. at 137 (Gregory, J., dissenting).  
 122.  Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)). 
 123.  Id. at 138 n.7. 
 124.  Id. 
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meaning given to the facts derived not just from the circumstances, but also 
from assumptions made about the character of the defendant.126 
In relying on the general, undefined concept of police officers’ “experi-
ence” to explain the logical leaps from making an observation to labeling it 
suspicious, the court misses the opportunity to do what it aims to do: discern 
whether the police officer had reasonable grounds for determining that a de-
fendant’s behavior is suspicious.  Indeed, the fact that a police officer may 
have experience does not mean that the police officer is not relying on short 
cuts, such as racial stereotypes or stock stories, to fill in the gaps. 
C. Implicit Racial Bias Can Fill In the Gaps 
While courts give deference to police officers’ experience to explain 
logical gaps in their analysis, police are not immune from the influence of 
racial bias.  As discussed in the beginning of this Part, the nature of a police 
officer’s job may even make them more vulnerable to reliance on stereotypes 
and other cognitive shortcuts.127  Current laws and procedures, however, can 
hinder the courts’ ability to identify implicit bias in police officers’ deci-
sionmaking.  Many legal standards allow little room for defendants to chal-
lenge police officers’ subjective perceptions and judgments which are labeled 
as objective facts and treated as invulnerable to racial bias.  This is the case 
even where there are factual clues suggesting that racial bias may have im-
pacted a police officer’s judgment.  Indeed, in its opinion in Mason, the ma-
jority omitted facts suggesting that the police officer took notice of the de-
fendant and his companion’s race as African American and associated the 
men’s race with criminality.128  Notably, these facts were included in the dis-
sent.129 
For example, the police officer’s testimony in Mason suggests that Ma-
son’s race may have drawn the police officer’s attention to him and shaped 
the police officer’s perception of events.130  On cross-examination, the officer 
                                                 
 126.  See Anderson, supra note 65, at 25 n.30 (“Indeed, it is our lightning-quick tendency to fill 
in the facts with a stock story that is responsible for much of the problems caused by implicit bias—
we fill in a (biased) story to fit a character we have learned is African-American or Hispanic.”); 
López, supra note 66, at 15 (discussing police officers’ reliance on “the most easily generated in-
formation”); Richardson, supra note 25, at 272 (“Implicit bias can cause individuals to interpret 
identical behaviors differently dependent solely upon the race of the individual observed.”).   
 127.  See supra note 24–25 and accompanying text. 
 128.  See generally Mason, 628 F.3d at 123–34 (majority opinion). 
 129.  See generally id. at 134–40 (Gregory, J., dissenting).  
 130.  Id. at 135.  Notably, similar clues that race may have played a role can be found in Terry.  
Thompson, supra note 18, at 968 (“But, with race eliminated from the case, the most obvious ex-
planation for McFadden’s suspicions and his subsequent actions was unavailable.  The Court was 
left with McFadden’s testimony that ‘he was unable to say precisely what first drew his eye to 
them.’” (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 5 (1968))). 
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testified that based on his “experience” he was suspicious of criminal activity 
“as soon as he pulled over Mason’s car,” and agreed that his suspicion was 
based on a “sort of gut instinct.”131  The officer’s testimony also demonstrates 
that the officer noted the race of Mason and his companion—describing them 
as “older black males, that [were] not in good shape”—in providing an ex-
planation for why he needed a K-9 unit on the scene.132  The officer stated 
that he did not feel that the men would challenge him physically, but he “felt 
like if they had a gun, we were probably fixing to shoot it out.”133   
At another point during the stop, the police officer indicated that Mason 
failed to make eye contact with him and that he thought this was a sign of 
criminality: 
Mason was [n]ot making eye contact, shifting his weight.  It’s hard 
to explain in the sense that if you’ve ever looked into the eyes of a 
person that’s looking at the rest of their life in prison they have a 
certain look about them.  And fear is hard to explain in that sense. 
But when you are looking at a person that is fearful it’s just a dif-
ferent look that every officer that I know understands.134 
It is worth noting that the evidence in that case, however, suggested that 
the police officer was not accurate in his reporting of even Mason’s observ-
able behavior.  According to the dissent, a video recording of the stop showed 
just the opposite of what the police officer indicated—Mason tried to make 
eye contact while the officer looked away.135  Nonetheless, the police officer 
shared both his inaccurate observation and the above narrative to describe 
why Mason appeared to him to be suspicious, and this did not deter the ma-
jority from finding legal justification for the police stop.136 
To address implicit bias, courts must be willing to take a more critical 
look at whether race, rather than experience, may be the reason that a police 
officer has made the leap from an observation of a defendant’s engagement 
in an innocent activity, to a narrative of suspicion.  Courts have too often 
allowed testimony of a few innocent behaviors and lots of stories, to justify 
reasonable suspicion.137 
                                                 
 131.  Mason, 628 F.3d at 134–35 (Gregory, J., dissenting).   
 132.  Id. at 135. 
 133.  Id. at 134–35 (“Regrettably, I must begin by supplementing and clarifying some key facts 
about Trooper Swicord’s detention of Mason that are omitted by the majority.”). 
 134.  Id. at 135. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Similarly, the suppression hearing transcript in Terry provides clues of a racial dynamic in 
that case that the Supreme Court’s opinion did not.  Thompson, supra note 18, at 964.  
 137.  David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means Stopped 
and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 669 (1994) (concluding that the evidence required for reasonable 
suspicion “has shifted, slowly but inexorably, to the point that a few innocent activities grouped 
together, or even no suspicious activities at all, can be enough”).  While beyond the scope of this 
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III.  CONCLUSION 
To justify a police stop, police officers must be able to point to “specific 
and articulable facts . . . taken together with rational inferences,” to justify 
reasonable suspicion.138  Police officers are not to rely on a mere “hunch.”139  
Implicit bias, however, can impact a police officer’s judgment as to what is 
suspicious behavior.  Racial stereotypes can work unconsciously in the back-
ground, shaping the officer’s perception.  Stock stories can play a role, 
providing a familiar narrative structure, and filling evidentiary gaps with as-
sumed knowledge. 
To effectively review police conduct, courts need to be able to critically 
assess police officers’ factual assertions, seek explanations for police offic-
ers’ logical leaps, and consider the relevance of race.  But, to do so, courts 
need to be aware of the embedded knowledge structures that are working 
behind the scenes, and to be able to “unpack” them. 140  For example, con-
cerning the police officer’s testimony in Mason, it would be important for a 
court to consider the pull of the stock story of black men as criminals that 
may have been at work in the police officer’s subconscious.  Indeed, a court 
should consider critically the strength of the evidence as it hears a police of-
ficer testify that a defendant seemed to be acting in a nervous manner, or even 
that a single key on a key ring could reasonably signal drug activity.  How-
ever, in addition to considering the strength of the evidence, courts might try 
to find ways to separate the observable facts from the meaning that readily 
attaches to them.  Judges might consider alternative narratives that match the 
police officer’s stated facts, or consider whether the police officer’s story 
makes sense if you change the race of the defendant. 
While they represent alternative narratives, stories of African-American 
males’ police encounters told outside the courtroom have seemed to gain lit-
tle traction inside the courtroom.  Perhaps the tides are turning.  In a recent 
case, Commonwealth v. Warren,141 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court considered reported findings of racial profiling in Boston in its reason-
able suspicion analysis of a case involving a black male defendant.142  In 
Warren, the court concluded that “the finding that black males in Boston are 
                                                 
Essay, it is worth noting that in many reasonable suspicion cases the location in which the defendant 
is stopped—often categorized as a “high crime area”—is not based on any specific behavior of the 
defendant other than his being present, but is often weighed in reasonable suspicion analysis.  Id. at 
685–86.  The loaded term “high crime area,” combined with a defendant’s racial status, would seem 
to only invite bias into a court’s analysis.  
 138.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). 
 139.  Id. at 27.  
 140.  Lee Anne Bell, The Story of the Storytelling Project: An Arts-Based Race and Social Jus-
tice Curriculum, 5 STORYTELLING, SELF, SOCIETY 107, 112 (2009). 
 141.  58 N.E.3d 333 (Mass. 2016).  
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disproportionately and repeatedly targeted for [police] encounters suggests a 
reason for flight totally unrelated to consciousness of guilt.”143  The court 
further instructed that “[g]iven this reality for black males in the city . . . , a 
judge should, in appropriate cases, consider the report’s findings in weighing 
flight as a factor in the reasonable suspicion calculus.”144  In challenging long 
held factual assumptions based on new information, the Massachusetts high 
court’s decision drew notice for its deviation from the status quo.145 
As the Massachusetts decision demonstrates, stories told outside the 
courtroom can play an important role in uncovering implicit bias.  Stock sto-
ries work to maintain the status quo, presenting a dominant narrative that 
often goes unchallenged.  But, counter-stories can help judges to develop a 
more critical ear: “Underneath the stock stories are numerous, teeming stories 
that talk back to the stock stories, that challenge them, that speak other-
wise.”146  Indeed, “[g]iven their special vantage point, concealed stories can 
teach us much about stock stories.”147  Juxtaposed to stock stories, counter-
stories can work to dismantle stock stories as truth and instead make them 
“just another story among many.”148 
To address implicit bias at a more fundamental level, it is important that 
courts move beyond the mislabeling of ambiguous evidence as “objective 
facts,” and the myth of police officers as infallible experts who are not vul-
nerable to the influence of racial bias.  Most importantly, courts must recog-
nize the legal relevance of conversations about race in Fourth Amendment 
analysis, and its necessity for meaningful judicial review. 
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